Trump wants South Korea to defend itself. His overtures to Kim Jong Un could delay that

Trump’s Exercise Cuts Undermine the Very Burden-Sharing He Demands of Seoul

A Halving of Ulchi Freedom Shield

Qwenews.com – At Washington’s behest, the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield drills — which draw tens of thousands of troops into joint operations — have been slashed by half. The decision followed remarks Trump made last weekend in which he characterized the maneuvers as irritating his friend Kim Jong Un and draining American coffers. The president posted on Truth Social on Sunday that the drills “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile,” language that reads as a bid to placate the reclusive North Korean leader, whom Trump has expressed eagerness to meet once more.

The characterization sits uneasily with the exercises’ stated purpose. Both capitals have consistently described the drills as exercises in deterrence and defense, not as preparations to seize territory north of the demilitarized zone that has separated the two Koreas since the 1953 armistice. The word “hostile” echoes, almost verbatim, the framing North Korea’s state media have long applied to the same events.

The Operational-Control Question Buried Inside the Drills

Beyond the visible troop movements, the exercises carry a less conspicuous but far more consequential function: they provide South Korea with training toward wartime operational control of the combined South Korea–US forces on the peninsula — a capability Seoul has lacked since the Korean War erupted in 1950. Analysts stress that this transfer is a central objective shared by both governments. Once Seoul demonstrates it can shoulder that burden, Washington intends to step back in any future conflict, supplying selected firepower while leaving the bulk of responsibility and expense to its ally.

How Command Arrived Where It Stands Today

The present arrangement dates to the war’s opening months, when South Korea ceded command of its forces to Washington — a far better-equipped and more experienced partner facing the communist threat at the dividing line. United Nations Command initially absorbed control of South Korean troops; in 1978 the Combined Forces Command (CFC), perpetually headed by an American general, took over that role. In 1994 the CFC handed peacetime operational control back to Seoul, yet wartime authority has remained in Washington ever since. Repeated proposals to alter that split, along with proposed timelines, have been deferred again and again, preserving a status quo that no longer serves either side.

Seoul’s Growing Capability and Lee’s 2030 Deadline

Over recent years South Korea has consolidated itself as a world-class military power — not yet matching the United States or China, but plainly able to defend itself against North Korea. Citing that capability, President Lee Jae Myung seized the launch of this year’s exercises on Tuesday to inject fresh momentum into a campaign pledge made in 2025: to return wartime operational control to Seoul by 2030.

“From the aspect of weapons systems and military strength, our capabilities to defend ourselves is already among the top few in the world. It’s not an exaggeration to say that we are more than capable,” Lee said Tuesday.

Experts Warn the Last-Minute Cut Derails an Alliance Project

Yu Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, explained in The Diplomat that the Ulchi Freedom Shield drills were slated to serve as the assessment mechanism through which Seoul would qualify for wartime operational control. A major last-minute alteration, he argued, would do more than degrade readiness:

“A major last-minute change could therefore affect more than readiness; it could complicate an alliance project that Washington itself has long encouraged,” Yu wrote. “Curtailing (the exercises), especially without prior discussion, makes burden-sharing harder to implement, even as Washington demands more of it,” he said.

Earlier this year, Lee Jeong-kyu, a visiting research fellow at South Korea’s Sejong Institute, noted that momentum toward greater South Korean control had been codified in the US National Defense Strategy released in January. That document, Lee observed, constituted “a clear signal of intent to strengthen alliance burden-sharing that is expected to provide grounds for accelerating the conditions for (operational control) transfer.”

Strategic Costs Beyond the Peninsula

By deferring to Kim Jong Un, Trump has effectively elevated a nuclear-armed adversary above a treaty ally seeking to do precisely what Washington has asked of it. The consequence is twofold. First, American forces remain anchored to peninsula responsibilities at a moment when they might be urgently required in Iran or in prospective conflicts across Asia and beyond. Second, future defense budgets cannot bank on cost savings from Korea while demand for new weapons systems continues to climb. South Korea has long stood as a close American ally; since the end of the Korean War, the alliance has been built on the premise that Seoul would progressively assume greater ownership of its own security.