Putin wants Africa on his side. African leaders are playing their own game
Africa’s Diplomatic Balancing Gives Russia a Stage, but Not a Blank Check
Qwenews.com – As the war in Ukraine continues to strain Russia’s relations with Western capitals, Moscow is looking south for diplomatic visibility, economic opportunities and security partnerships. The latest Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow offered President Vladimir Putin a high-profile chance to make that case before leaders and delegations from across the continent.
Putin presented Russia as an alternative to Western powers, accusing them of retaining exploitative and colonial-era approaches to Africa’s resources and development. He argued that closer links with Moscow in trade, technology and investment could offer a more equal partnership.
“Our business does not engage in the predatory, neo-colonial exploitation of natural and human resources,” Putin said, adding that Russian companies supported local job creation and tax revenues.
Forty-eight of Africa’s 54 countries sent delegations to the two-day gathering. Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov said 22 countries were represented by presidents or other heads of state, up from 17 at the 2023 summit. The first Russia-Africa meeting, held in 2019, drew representatives from 43 countries.
For Moscow, those images carry political weight. Russia faces extensive Western sanctions and growing isolation in many international forums. Pictures of Putin meeting African leaders can reinforce the message that Russia remains engaged well beyond Europe and retains partners throughout the Global South.
Will Brown, an Africa policy specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations, has argued that the summit’s political narrative may ultimately matter more than its formal agreements. Images from the event can be reused by Russian influence networks to shape public perceptions across Africa and elsewhere.
“The ‘story’ of the summit is the most important thing,” Brown said.
Partnerships Without Permanent Alignment
African governments are not simply lining up behind either Russia or Western countries. Tighisti Amare, director of the Africa Program at Chatham House, describes the wider strategy as “diversified non-alignment”: maintaining links with multiple outside powers while avoiding a lasting commitment to any single bloc.
That approach reflects the varied priorities of African states. A government facing insurgency may seek military assistance. Another may be more interested in grain, fertilizer, energy investment, technology transfers or diplomatic support. Competition among international partners can also help governments negotiate more favorable terms from Europe, the United States, China, Russia and others.
This is particularly visible in the Sahel, the semi-arid region stretching south of the Sahara. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all seen military-led governments move closer to Moscow after ruptures with Western security partners. Russia has used those openings to strengthen its military and political footprint.
From Wagner to Africa Corps
Russia’s expanding security role is now centered on the Africa Corps, a paramilitary force that took over much of the work once performed by Wagner after the mercenary group’s 2023 mutiny against the Kremlin. The change was not merely cosmetic. Africa Corps functions openly under Russia’s Defense Ministry and military intelligence structures.
Many of its personnel previously served with Wagner, but its role places greater emphasis on training local forces, advising governments and guarding strategically important locations. Its presence is linked to a broader Kremlin effort to maintain influence while bringing overseas security operations under tighter state control.
Anna Ida Rock, a researcher at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, says Africa Corps has a presence in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mali and Niger. Russian military instructors have also been present in the Republic of Congo, Madagascar and Togo, though assertions concerning Togo remain contested.
Moscow is also pursuing access to the Red Sea through a proposed naval facility in Sudan. A permanent maritime foothold there would hold strategic significance because the waterway connects the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean through one of the world’s most important shipping corridors.
The transition from Wagner has not unfolded identically everywhere. Wagner remains active in the Central African Republic, where the government has resisted a complete switch to Africa Corps. Russian forces have helped the government remain in office, yet insecurity continues and many civilians have not experienced a corresponding improvement in safety.
Security Gains, Continuing Instability
Russia’s military partnerships have produced mixed outcomes. In Mali, Russian forces helped government troops regain control of Kidal, a city in the country’s northeast. At the same time, insecurity has deteriorated and Africa Corps has sustained substantial losses.
In Burkina Faso, Russian personnel have concentrated on protecting the government during a period of political uncertainty. Their role in Niger appears more limited. Across these relationships, the appeal of Russian assistance rests partly on its willingness to work with governments that have become frustrated with conditions attached to Western security ties.
Yet military support does not automatically resolve the conflicts driving instability. Armed groups, fragile state institutions, local grievances and competition over territory remain difficult challenges. The durability of Russia’s role will depend not only on access to leaders and strategic sites, but also on whether its partners can demonstrate stronger security for ordinary citizens.
Economic Limits to Moscow’s Influence
Russia’s political and security profile in Africa exceeds its commercial ties with the continent. Trade has been estimated at $27 billion, a relatively modest figure when compared with Africa’s economic relationships with larger trading partners. That gap highlights both the limits of Moscow’s influence and the opportunity it sees in expanding commercial engagement.
The Moscow summit demonstrated that African leaders are prepared to engage with Russia when it suits their national interests. But engagement should not be mistaken for automatic loyalty. Many governments are seeking options, leverage and practical benefits from several competing partners. Russia may gain influence through diplomacy and security cooperation, while African states continue to play their own strategic game.
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